I am doing a login page. I have UITextField for password.
Obviously, I do not want the password to be seen; instead, I want circles to show when typing.
How do you set the field for this to happen?
iosipadiphoneSecurityswift
I am doing a login page. I have UITextField for password.
Obviously, I do not want the password to be seen; instead, I want circles to show when typing.
How do you set the field for this to happen?
It's certainly possible to develop on a Windows machine, in fact, my first application was exclusively developed on the old Dell Precision I had at the time :)
There are three routes;
The first route requires modifying (or using a pre-modified) image of Leopard that can be installed on a regular PC. This is not as hard as you would think, although your success/effort ratio will depend upon how closely the hardware in your PC matches that in Mac hardware - e.g. if you're running a Core 2 Duo on an Intel Motherboard, with an NVidia graphics card you are laughing. If you're running an AMD machine or something without SSE3 it gets a little more involved.
If you purchase (or already own) a version of Leopard then this is a gray area since the Leopard EULA states you may only run it on an "Apple Labeled" machine. As many point out if you stick an Apple sticker on your PC you're probably covered.
The second option is more costly. The EULA for the workstation version of Leopard prevents it from being run under emulation and as a result, there's no support in VMWare for this. Leopard server, however, CAN be run under emulation and can be used for desktop purposes. Leopard server and VMWare are expensive, however.
If you're interested in option 1) I would suggest starting at Insanelymac and reading the OSx86 sections.
I do think you should consider whether the time you will invest is going to be worth the money you will save though. It was for me because I enjoy tinkering with this type of stuff and I started during the early iPhone betas, months before their App Store became available.
Alternatively, you could pick up a low-spec Mac Mini from eBay. You don't need much horsepower to run the SDK and you can always sell it on later if you decide to stop development or buy a better Mac.
Update: You cannot create a Mac OS X Client virtual machine for OS X 10.6 and earlier. Apple does not allow these Client OSes to be virtualized. With Mac OS X 10.7 (Lion) onwards, Apple has changed its licensing agreement in regards to virtualization. Source: VMWare KnowledgeBase
DISCLAIMER: This answer was written in 2008.
Since then, PHP has given us
password_hash
andpassword_verify
and, since their introduction, they are the recommended password hashing & checking method.The theory of the answer is still a good read though.
\0
in it, which can seriously weaken security.)The objective behind hashing passwords is simple: preventing malicious access to user accounts by compromising the database. So the goal of password hashing is to deter a hacker or cracker by costing them too much time or money to calculate the plain-text passwords. And time/cost are the best deterrents in your arsenal.
Another reason that you want a good, robust hash on a user accounts is to give you enough time to change all the passwords in the system. If your database is compromised you will need enough time to at least lock the system down, if not change every password in the database.
Jeremiah Grossman, CTO of Whitehat Security, stated on White Hat Security blog after a recent password recovery that required brute-force breaking of his password protection:
Interestingly, in living out this nightmare, I learned A LOT I didn’t know about password cracking, storage, and complexity. I’ve come to appreciate why password storage is ever so much more important than password complexity. If you don’t know how your password is stored, then all you really can depend upon is complexity. This might be common knowledge to password and crypto pros, but for the average InfoSec or Web Security expert, I highly doubt it.
(Emphasis mine.)
Entropy. (Not that I fully subscribe to Randall's viewpoint.)
In short, entropy is how much variation is within the password. When a password is only lowercase roman letters, that's only 26 characters. That isn't much variation. Alpha-numeric passwords are better, with 36 characters. But allowing upper and lower case, with symbols, is roughly 96 characters. That's a lot better than just letters. One problem is, to make our passwords memorable we insert patterns—which reduces entropy. Oops!
Password entropy is approximated easily. Using the full range of ascii characters (roughly 96 typeable characters) yields an entropy of 6.6 per character, which at 8 characters for a password is still too low (52.679 bits of entropy) for future security. But the good news is: longer passwords, and passwords with unicode characters, really increase the entropy of a password and make it harder to crack.
There's a longer discussion of password entropy on the Crypto StackExchange site. A good Google search will also turn up a lot of results.
In the comments I talked with @popnoodles, who pointed out that enforcing a password policy of X length with X many letters, numbers, symbols, etc, can actually reduce entropy by making the password scheme more predictable. I do agree. Randomess, as truly random as possible, is always the safest but least memorable solution.
So far as I've been able to tell, making the world's best password is a Catch-22. Either its not memorable, too predictable, too short, too many unicode characters (hard to type on a Windows/Mobile device), too long, etc. No password is truly good enough for our purposes, so we must protect them as though they were in Fort Knox.
Bcrypt and scrypt are the current best practices. Scrypt will be better than bcrypt in time, but it hasn't seen adoption as a standard by Linux/Unix or by webservers, and hasn't had in-depth reviews of its algorithm posted yet. But still, the future of the algorithm does look promising. If you are working with Ruby there is an scrypt gem that will help you out, and Node.js now has its own scrypt package. You can use Scrypt in PHP either via the Scrypt extension or the Libsodium extension (both are available in PECL).
I highly suggest reading the documentation for the crypt function if you want to understand how to use bcrypt, or finding yourself a good wrapper or use something like PHPASS for a more legacy implementation. I recommend a minimum of 12 rounds of bcrypt, if not 15 to 18.
I changed my mind about using bcrypt when I learned that bcrypt only uses blowfish's key schedule, with a variable cost mechanism. The latter lets you increase the cost to brute-force a password by increasing blowfish's already expensive key schedule.
I almost can't imagine this situation anymore. PHPASS supports PHP 3.0.18 through 5.3, so it is usable on almost every installation imaginable—and should be used if you don't know for certain that your environment supports bcrypt.
But suppose that you cannot use bcrypt or PHPASS at all. What then?
Try an implementation of PDKBF2 with the maximum number of rounds that your environment/application/user-perception can tolerate. The lowest number I'd recommend is 2500 rounds. Also, make sure to use hash_hmac() if it is available to make the operation harder to reproduce.
Coming in PHP 5.5 is a full password protection library that abstracts away any pains of working with bcrypt. While most of us are stuck with PHP 5.2 and 5.3 in most common environments, especially shared hosts, @ircmaxell has built a compatibility layer for the coming API that is backward compatible to PHP 5.3.7.
The computational power required to actually crack a hashed password doesn't exist. The only way for computers to "crack" a password is to recreate it and simulate the hashing algorithm used to secure it. The speed of the hash is linearly related to its ability to be brute-forced. Worse still, most hash algorithms can be easily parallelized to perform even faster. This is why costly schemes like bcrypt and scrypt are so important.
You cannot possibly foresee all threats or avenues of attack, and so you must make your best effort to protect your users up front. If you do not, then you might even miss the fact that you were attacked until it's too late... and you're liable. To avoid that situation, act paranoid to begin with. Attack your own software (internally) and attempt to steal user credentials, or modify other user's accounts or access their data. If you don't test the security of your system, then you cannot blame anyone but yourself.
Lastly: I am not a cryptographer. Whatever I've said is my opinion, but I happen to think it's based on good ol' common sense ... and lots of reading. Remember, be as paranoid as possible, make things as hard to intrude as possible, and then, if you are still worried, contact a white-hat hacker or cryptographer to see what they say about your code/system.
Best Answer
Please set your UItextField property secure..
Try this..
textFieldSecure is your UITextField...