The correct way to avoid SQL injection attacks, no matter which database you use, is to separate the data from SQL, so that data stays data and will never be interpreted as commands by the SQL parser. It is possible to create SQL statement with correctly formatted data parts, but if you don't fully understand the details, you should always use prepared statements and parameterized queries. These are SQL statements that are sent to and parsed by the database server separately from any parameters. This way it is impossible for an attacker to inject malicious SQL.
You basically have two options to achieve this:
Using PDO (for any supported database driver):
$stmt = $pdo->prepare('SELECT * FROM employees WHERE name = :name');
$stmt->execute([ 'name' => $name ]);
foreach ($stmt as $row) {
// Do something with $row
}
Using MySQLi (for MySQL):
$stmt = $dbConnection->prepare('SELECT * FROM employees WHERE name = ?');
$stmt->bind_param('s', $name); // 's' specifies the variable type => 'string'
$stmt->execute();
$result = $stmt->get_result();
while ($row = $result->fetch_assoc()) {
// Do something with $row
}
If you're connecting to a database other than MySQL, there is a driver-specific second option that you can refer to (for example, pg_prepare()
and pg_execute()
for PostgreSQL). PDO is the universal option.
Correctly setting up the connection
Note that when using PDO to access a MySQL database real prepared statements are not used by default. To fix this you have to disable the emulation of prepared statements. An example of creating a connection using PDO is:
$dbConnection = new PDO('mysql:dbname=dbtest;host=127.0.0.1;charset=utf8', 'user', 'password');
$dbConnection->setAttribute(PDO::ATTR_EMULATE_PREPARES, false);
$dbConnection->setAttribute(PDO::ATTR_ERRMODE, PDO::ERRMODE_EXCEPTION);
In the above example the error mode isn't strictly necessary, but it is advised to add it. This way the script will not stop with a Fatal Error
when something goes wrong. And it gives the developer the chance to catch
any error(s) which are throw
n as PDOException
s.
What is mandatory, however, is the first setAttribute()
line, which tells PDO to disable emulated prepared statements and use real prepared statements. This makes sure the statement and the values aren't parsed by PHP before sending it to the MySQL server (giving a possible attacker no chance to inject malicious SQL).
Although you can set the charset
in the options of the constructor, it's important to note that 'older' versions of PHP (before 5.3.6) silently ignored the charset parameter in the DSN.
Explanation
The SQL statement you pass to prepare
is parsed and compiled by the database server. By specifying parameters (either a ?
or a named parameter like :name
in the example above) you tell the database engine where you want to filter on. Then when you call execute
, the prepared statement is combined with the parameter values you specify.
The important thing here is that the parameter values are combined with the compiled statement, not an SQL string. SQL injection works by tricking the script into including malicious strings when it creates SQL to send to the database. So by sending the actual SQL separately from the parameters, you limit the risk of ending up with something you didn't intend.
Any parameters you send when using a prepared statement will just be treated as strings (although the database engine may do some optimization so parameters may end up as numbers too, of course). In the example above, if the $name
variable contains 'Sarah'; DELETE FROM employees
the result would simply be a search for the string "'Sarah'; DELETE FROM employees"
, and you will not end up with an empty table.
Another benefit of using prepared statements is that if you execute the same statement many times in the same session it will only be parsed and compiled once, giving you some speed gains.
Oh, and since you asked about how to do it for an insert, here's an example (using PDO):
$preparedStatement = $db->prepare('INSERT INTO table (column) VALUES (:column)');
$preparedStatement->execute([ 'column' => $unsafeValue ]);
Can prepared statements be used for dynamic queries?
While you can still use prepared statements for the query parameters, the structure of the dynamic query itself cannot be parametrized and certain query features cannot be parametrized.
For these specific scenarios, the best thing to do is use a whitelist filter that restricts the possible values.
// Value whitelist
// $dir can only be 'DESC', otherwise it will be 'ASC'
if (empty($dir) || $dir !== 'DESC') {
$dir = 'ASC';
}
There are different ways to delete an array element, where some are more useful for some specific tasks than others.
Deleting a single array element
If you want to delete just one array element you can use unset()
or alternatively \array_splice()
.
If you know the value and don’t know the key to delete the element you can use \array_search()
to get the key. This only works if the element does not occur more than once, since \array_search
returns the first hit only.
Note that when you use unset()
the array keys won’t change. If you want to reindex the keys you can use \array_values()
after unset()
, which will convert all keys to numerically enumerated keys starting from 0.
Code:
$array = [0 => "a", 1 => "b", 2 => "c"];
unset($array[1]);
// ↑ Key which you want to delete
Output:
[
[0] => a
[2] => c
]
If you use \array_splice()
the keys will automatically be reindexed, but the associative keys won’t change — as opposed to \array_values()
, which will convert all keys to numerical keys.
\array_splice()
needs the offset, not the key, as the second parameter.
Code:
$array = [0 => "a", 1 => "b", 2 => "c"];
\array_splice($array, 1, 1);
// ↑ Offset which you want to delete
Output:
[
[0] => a
[1] => c
]
array_splice()
, same as unset()
, take the array by reference. You don’t assign the return values of those functions back to the array.
Deleting multiple array elements
If you want to delete multiple array elements and don’t want to call unset()
or \array_splice()
multiple times you can use the functions \array_diff()
or \array_diff_key()
depending on whether you know the values or the keys of the elements which you want to delete.
If you know the values of the array elements which you want to delete, then you can use \array_diff()
. As before with unset()
it won’t change the keys of the array.
Code:
$array = [0 => "a", 1 => "b", 2 => "c", 3 => "c"];
$array = \array_diff($array, ["a", "c"]);
// └────────┘
// Array values which you want to delete
Output:
[
[1] => b
]
If you know the keys of the elements which you want to delete, then you want to use \array_diff_key()
. You have to make sure you pass the keys as keys in the second parameter and not as values. Keys won’t reindex.
Code:
$array = [0 => "a", 1 => "b", 2 => "c"];
$array = \array_diff_key($array, [0 => "xy", "2" => "xy"]);
// ↑ ↑
// Array keys which you want to delete
Output:
[
[1] => b
]
If you want to use unset()
or \array_splice()
to delete multiple elements with the same value you can use \array_keys()
to get all the keys for a specific value and then delete all elements.
Best Answer
Wordpress has a nice article explaining unix file permissions. Read it and you'll grasp the basics of it. In short (and not theoratically correct):
Unix systems designate 3 different 'roles': the user, the group and the world. Especially 'the world' seems to confuse people.
Every file AND directory (which are both nodes and as such not that different in Linux systems) is assigned to a user and a group. You can see the user and group as 'owners' of the specific file/directory (I'll talk about 'nodes' further on, because it doesn't really matter). File permissions define who can do what with the nodes. Example given:
The file index.php is assigned to user 'aso' and group 'www-data' and has file permission modus 644. This means that the user (6) has read and write permissions, the group has merely read permissions (4), as is 'the world' (the last 4 of the three digits).
Now first you have to understand that EVERY user on a *nix system is part of a group. The group name is sometimes the same as the user name, but A GROUP IS ANOTHER ENTITY. So it is possible that you have a user as well as a group named 'aso'.
File permssions are build from a 'bitmask' as follows: read permissions are designated by the digit 4, write by 2, and execute by 1. Any combination can be made from this. In example write and execute permissions are designated with 3 (write = 2, execute = 1), and read and execute permissions are designated with 5 (read = 4, execute = 1).
Let's see what this means, and I have to be as fair as to say that I cannot be complete in this matter. Please use Google if you want a complete story.
If I create a file on my *nix system it is automatically assigned to me (my user) and the group my user is part of. Having the permissions 644 this means that I (logged in with my own user) can read the file and can alter (write) it. But I do not have the execute (x) permissions. It doesn't matter however because this only applies to executable scripts (shell scripts, most of the times with a .sh extension). The group the file belongs to ('www-data') only has read permissions, so cannot alter the file. The 'world' also only has read permissions.
Please note that a user can be part of multiple groups, and as such *nix file permissions have a limited scope: you might want to assign write permissions to group 1, and only read permissions to group 2. In traditional file systems this is not possible. However file systems like reiserFS and Ext3 may use an extended ACL to accomplish stuff like that. That's another story however.
What does this all means? It's more easy then expected actually, as long as you understand what the assigned rights mean and what is the difference between a file node and a directory node.
Files
Directories
Back to your case. If you have a normal setup (a Linux server running Apache and PHP as a module) your files will be assigned to your ftp user and the group 'www-data' (the group Apache is running from). You yourself need read AND write permissions (as sometimes you want to change a file), but DO NOT NEED execute permissions (as PHP - or HTML for that matter - are not executables). So for the user, you'd need a 6 (read = 4, write = 2, combined makes 6). For the group user you only need read permissions, as Apache (or the PHP module) only need to read the contents of your php script. Any other user on the system has nothing to do with your files, and as such need no permissions as all (0).
So, for ALL your scripts, permissions of 640 (read and write for the user, read for the group and none for 'the world') are sufficient.
For the directories your user needs all permissions (read = 4, write = 2, execute = 1, 7 in total). Why? Because it needs to read it's contents (node names), has to be able to determine if it's a file or directory node (and other properties) AND has to be able to add and delete files (you want to add files sometimes, don't you?). So we'll giver your user a 7.
The group however ('www-data', the group Apache is running from) only need read and execute permissions. The read permissions to list the contents (node names) and the execute permissins to list other properties (node type, modification time etc.). It doesn't need write permissions though, because normally you don't want PHP (Apache) to add/delete files from your application tree.
Lastly the 'world', which is every other user on the system (that's NOT the same as the world in it's broadest sense) doesn't need any permissions. Why would anyone else on the server need access to your files?
Combined that would make 750 (all permissions for the user, read and execute for the group, none for others).
Summarized answer to your question, the bare minimum is:
But always good, quite standard and secure enough: