The correct way to avoid SQL injection attacks, no matter which database you use, is to separate the data from SQL, so that data stays data and will never be interpreted as commands by the SQL parser. It is possible to create SQL statement with correctly formatted data parts, but if you don't fully understand the details, you should always use prepared statements and parameterized queries. These are SQL statements that are sent to and parsed by the database server separately from any parameters. This way it is impossible for an attacker to inject malicious SQL.
You basically have two options to achieve this:
Using PDO (for any supported database driver):
$stmt = $pdo->prepare('SELECT * FROM employees WHERE name = :name');
$stmt->execute([ 'name' => $name ]);
foreach ($stmt as $row) {
// Do something with $row
}
Using MySQLi (for MySQL):
$stmt = $dbConnection->prepare('SELECT * FROM employees WHERE name = ?');
$stmt->bind_param('s', $name); // 's' specifies the variable type => 'string'
$stmt->execute();
$result = $stmt->get_result();
while ($row = $result->fetch_assoc()) {
// Do something with $row
}
If you're connecting to a database other than MySQL, there is a driver-specific second option that you can refer to (for example, pg_prepare()
and pg_execute()
for PostgreSQL). PDO is the universal option.
Correctly setting up the connection
Note that when using PDO to access a MySQL database real prepared statements are not used by default. To fix this you have to disable the emulation of prepared statements. An example of creating a connection using PDO is:
$dbConnection = new PDO('mysql:dbname=dbtest;host=127.0.0.1;charset=utf8', 'user', 'password');
$dbConnection->setAttribute(PDO::ATTR_EMULATE_PREPARES, false);
$dbConnection->setAttribute(PDO::ATTR_ERRMODE, PDO::ERRMODE_EXCEPTION);
In the above example the error mode isn't strictly necessary, but it is advised to add it. This way the script will not stop with a Fatal Error
when something goes wrong. And it gives the developer the chance to catch
any error(s) which are throw
n as PDOException
s.
What is mandatory, however, is the first setAttribute()
line, which tells PDO to disable emulated prepared statements and use real prepared statements. This makes sure the statement and the values aren't parsed by PHP before sending it to the MySQL server (giving a possible attacker no chance to inject malicious SQL).
Although you can set the charset
in the options of the constructor, it's important to note that 'older' versions of PHP (before 5.3.6) silently ignored the charset parameter in the DSN.
Explanation
The SQL statement you pass to prepare
is parsed and compiled by the database server. By specifying parameters (either a ?
or a named parameter like :name
in the example above) you tell the database engine where you want to filter on. Then when you call execute
, the prepared statement is combined with the parameter values you specify.
The important thing here is that the parameter values are combined with the compiled statement, not an SQL string. SQL injection works by tricking the script into including malicious strings when it creates SQL to send to the database. So by sending the actual SQL separately from the parameters, you limit the risk of ending up with something you didn't intend.
Any parameters you send when using a prepared statement will just be treated as strings (although the database engine may do some optimization so parameters may end up as numbers too, of course). In the example above, if the $name
variable contains 'Sarah'; DELETE FROM employees
the result would simply be a search for the string "'Sarah'; DELETE FROM employees"
, and you will not end up with an empty table.
Another benefit of using prepared statements is that if you execute the same statement many times in the same session it will only be parsed and compiled once, giving you some speed gains.
Oh, and since you asked about how to do it for an insert, here's an example (using PDO):
$preparedStatement = $db->prepare('INSERT INTO table (column) VALUES (:column)');
$preparedStatement->execute([ 'column' => $unsafeValue ]);
Can prepared statements be used for dynamic queries?
While you can still use prepared statements for the query parameters, the structure of the dynamic query itself cannot be parametrized and certain query features cannot be parametrized.
For these specific scenarios, the best thing to do is use a whitelist filter that restricts the possible values.
// Value whitelist
// $dir can only be 'DESC', otherwise it will be 'ASC'
if (empty($dir) || $dir !== 'DESC') {
$dir = 'ASC';
}
Tracking it down
At first I thought this was a coercion bug where null
was getting coerced to "null"
and a test of "null" == null
was passing. It's not. I was close, but so very, very wrong. Sorry about that!
I've since done lots of fiddling on wonderfl.net and tracing through the code in mx.rpc.xml.*
. At line 1795 of XMLEncoder
(in the 3.5 source), in setValue
, all of the XMLEncoding boils down to
currentChild.appendChild(xmlSpecialCharsFilter(Object(value)));
which is essentially the same as:
currentChild.appendChild("null");
This code, according to my original fiddle, returns an empty XML element. But why?
Cause
According to commenter Justin Mclean on bug report FLEX-33664, the following is the culprit (see last two tests in my fiddle which verify this):
var thisIsNotNull:XML = <root>null</root>;
if(thisIsNotNull == null){
// always branches here, as (thisIsNotNull == null) strangely returns true
// despite the fact that thisIsNotNull is a valid instance of type XML
}
When currentChild.appendChild
is passed the string "null"
, it first converts it to a root XML element with text null
, and then tests that element against the null literal. This is a weak equality test, so either the XML containing null is coerced to the null type, or the null type is coerced to a root xml element containing the string "null", and the test passes where it arguably should fail. One fix might be to always use strict equality tests when checking XML (or anything, really) for "nullness."
Solution
The only reasonable workaround I can think of, short of fixing this bug in every damn version of ActionScript, is to test fields for "null" and
escape them as CDATA values.
CDATA values are the most appropriate way to mutate an entire text value that would otherwise cause encoding/decoding problems. Hex encoding, for instance, is meant for individual characters. CDATA values are preferred when you're escaping the entire text of an element. The biggest reason for this is that it maintains human readability.
Best Answer
Instead of
null
or''
, explicitly returnnew soapval( 'element','xsd:dateTime', null )
.(Some) courtesy of the NuSOAP Sourceforge forums.