The correct way to avoid SQL injection attacks, no matter which database you use, is to separate the data from SQL, so that data stays data and will never be interpreted as commands by the SQL parser. It is possible to create SQL statement with correctly formatted data parts, but if you don't fully understand the details, you should always use prepared statements and parameterized queries. These are SQL statements that are sent to and parsed by the database server separately from any parameters. This way it is impossible for an attacker to inject malicious SQL.
You basically have two options to achieve this:
Using PDO (for any supported database driver):
$stmt = $pdo->prepare('SELECT * FROM employees WHERE name = :name');
$stmt->execute([ 'name' => $name ]);
foreach ($stmt as $row) {
// Do something with $row
}
Using MySQLi (for MySQL):
$stmt = $dbConnection->prepare('SELECT * FROM employees WHERE name = ?');
$stmt->bind_param('s', $name); // 's' specifies the variable type => 'string'
$stmt->execute();
$result = $stmt->get_result();
while ($row = $result->fetch_assoc()) {
// Do something with $row
}
If you're connecting to a database other than MySQL, there is a driver-specific second option that you can refer to (for example, pg_prepare()
and pg_execute()
for PostgreSQL). PDO is the universal option.
Correctly setting up the connection
Note that when using PDO to access a MySQL database real prepared statements are not used by default. To fix this you have to disable the emulation of prepared statements. An example of creating a connection using PDO is:
$dbConnection = new PDO('mysql:dbname=dbtest;host=127.0.0.1;charset=utf8', 'user', 'password');
$dbConnection->setAttribute(PDO::ATTR_EMULATE_PREPARES, false);
$dbConnection->setAttribute(PDO::ATTR_ERRMODE, PDO::ERRMODE_EXCEPTION);
In the above example the error mode isn't strictly necessary, but it is advised to add it. This way the script will not stop with a Fatal Error
when something goes wrong. And it gives the developer the chance to catch
any error(s) which are throw
n as PDOException
s.
What is mandatory, however, is the first setAttribute()
line, which tells PDO to disable emulated prepared statements and use real prepared statements. This makes sure the statement and the values aren't parsed by PHP before sending it to the MySQL server (giving a possible attacker no chance to inject malicious SQL).
Although you can set the charset
in the options of the constructor, it's important to note that 'older' versions of PHP (before 5.3.6) silently ignored the charset parameter in the DSN.
Explanation
The SQL statement you pass to prepare
is parsed and compiled by the database server. By specifying parameters (either a ?
or a named parameter like :name
in the example above) you tell the database engine where you want to filter on. Then when you call execute
, the prepared statement is combined with the parameter values you specify.
The important thing here is that the parameter values are combined with the compiled statement, not an SQL string. SQL injection works by tricking the script into including malicious strings when it creates SQL to send to the database. So by sending the actual SQL separately from the parameters, you limit the risk of ending up with something you didn't intend.
Any parameters you send when using a prepared statement will just be treated as strings (although the database engine may do some optimization so parameters may end up as numbers too, of course). In the example above, if the $name
variable contains 'Sarah'; DELETE FROM employees
the result would simply be a search for the string "'Sarah'; DELETE FROM employees"
, and you will not end up with an empty table.
Another benefit of using prepared statements is that if you execute the same statement many times in the same session it will only be parsed and compiled once, giving you some speed gains.
Oh, and since you asked about how to do it for an insert, here's an example (using PDO):
$preparedStatement = $db->prepare('INSERT INTO table (column) VALUES (:column)');
$preparedStatement->execute([ 'column' => $unsafeValue ]);
Can prepared statements be used for dynamic queries?
While you can still use prepared statements for the query parameters, the structure of the dynamic query itself cannot be parametrized and certain query features cannot be parametrized.
For these specific scenarios, the best thing to do is use a whitelist filter that restricts the possible values.
// Value whitelist
// $dir can only be 'DESC', otherwise it will be 'ASC'
if (empty($dir) || $dir !== 'DESC') {
$dir = 'ASC';
}
The fully RFC 822 compliant regex is inefficient and obscure because of its length. Fortunately, RFC 822 was superseded twice and the current specification for email addresses is RFC 5322. RFC 5322 leads to a regex that can be understood if studied for a few minutes and is efficient enough for actual use.
One RFC 5322 compliant regex can be found at the top of the page at http://emailregex.com/ but uses the IP address pattern that is floating around the internet with a bug that allows 00
for any of the unsigned byte decimal values in a dot-delimited address, which is illegal. The rest of it appears to be consistent with the RFC 5322 grammar and passes several tests using grep -Po
, including cases domain names, IP addresses, bad ones, and account names with and without quotes.
Correcting the 00
bug in the IP pattern, we obtain a working and fairly fast regex. (Scrape the rendered version, not the markdown, for actual code.)
(?:[a-z0-9!#$%&'*+/=?^_`{|}~-]+(?:\.[a-z0-9!#$%&'*+/=?^_`{|}~-]+)*|"(?:[\x01-\x08\x0b\x0c\x0e-\x1f\x21\x23-\x5b\x5d-\x7f]|\\[\x01-\x09\x0b\x0c\x0e-\x7f])*")@(?:(?:[a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9-]*[a-z0-9])?\.)+[a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9-]*[a-z0-9])?|\[(?:(?:(2(5[0-5]|[0-4][0-9])|1[0-9][0-9]|[1-9]?[0-9]))\.){3}(?:(2(5[0-5]|[0-4][0-9])|1[0-9][0-9]|[1-9]?[0-9])|[a-z0-9-]*[a-z0-9]:(?:[\x01-\x08\x0b\x0c\x0e-\x1f\x21-\x5a\x53-\x7f]|\\[\x01-\x09\x0b\x0c\x0e-\x7f])+)\])
or:
(?:[a-z0-9!#$%&'*+/=?^_`{|}~-]+(?:\.[a-z0-9!#$%&'*+/=?^_`{|}~-]+)*|"(?:[\x01-\x08\x0b\x0c\x0e-\x1f\x21\x23-\x5b\x5d-\x7f]|\\[\x01-\x09\x0b\x0c\x0e-\x7f])*")@(?:(?:[a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9-]*[a-z0-9])?\.)+[a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9-]*[a-z0-9])?|\[(?:(?:(2(5[0-5]|[0-4][0-9])|1[0-9][0-9]|[1-9]?[0-9]))\.){3}(?:(2(5[0-5]|[0-4][0-9])|1[0-9][0-9]|[1-9]?[0-9])|[a-z0-9-]*[a-z0-9]:(?:[\x01-\x08\x0b\x0c\x0e-\x1f\x21-\x5a\x53-\x7f]|\\[\x01-\x09\x0b\x0c\x0e-\x7f])+)\])
Here is diagram of finite state machine for above regexp which is more clear than regexp itself
The more sophisticated patterns in Perl and PCRE (regex library used e.g. in PHP) can correctly parse RFC 5322 without a hitch. Python and C# can do that too, but they use a different syntax from those first two. However, if you are forced to use one of the many less powerful pattern-matching languages, then it’s best to use a real parser.
It's also important to understand that validating it per the RFC tells you absolutely nothing about whether that address actually exists at the supplied domain, or whether the person entering the address is its true owner. People sign others up to mailing lists this way all the time. Fixing that requires a fancier kind of validation that involves sending that address a message that includes a confirmation token meant to be entered on the same web page as was the address.
Confirmation tokens are the only way to know you got the address of the person entering it. This is why most mailing lists now use that mechanism to confirm sign-ups. After all, anybody can put down president@whitehouse.gov
, and that will even parse as legal, but it isn't likely to be the person at the other end.
For PHP, you should not use the pattern given in Validate an E-Mail Address with PHP, the Right Way from which I quote:
There is some danger that common usage and widespread sloppy coding will establish a de facto standard for e-mail addresses that is more restrictive than the recorded formal standard.
That is no better than all the other non-RFC patterns. It isn’t even smart enough to handle even RFC 822, let alone RFC 5322. This one, however, is.
If you want to get fancy and pedantic, implement a complete state engine. A regular expression can only act as a rudimentary filter. The problem with regular expressions is that telling someone that their perfectly valid e-mail address is invalid (a false positive) because your regular expression can't handle it is just rude and impolite from the user's perspective. A state engine for the purpose can both validate and even correct e-mail addresses that would otherwise be considered invalid as it disassembles the e-mail address according to each RFC. This allows for a potentially more pleasing experience, like
The specified e-mail address 'myemail@address,com' is invalid. Did you mean 'myemail@address.com'?
See also Validating Email Addresses, including the comments. Or Comparing E-mail Address Validating Regular Expressions.
Debuggex Demo
Best Answer
PHP regex strings need delimiters. Try:
Also, note that you have a lower case o, not a zero. In addition, if you're just validating, you don't need the capturing group, and can simplify the regex to
/^\d+$/
.Example: http://ideone.com/Ec3zh
See also: PHP - Delimiters