Algorithm
To generate a random string, concatenate characters drawn randomly from the set of acceptable symbols until the string reaches the desired length.
Implementation
Here's some fairly simple and very flexible code for generating random identifiers. Read the information that follows for important application notes.
public class RandomString {
/**
* Generate a random string.
*/
public String nextString() {
for (int idx = 0; idx < buf.length; ++idx)
buf[idx] = symbols[random.nextInt(symbols.length)];
return new String(buf);
}
public static final String upper = "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ";
public static final String lower = upper.toLowerCase(Locale.ROOT);
public static final String digits = "0123456789";
public static final String alphanum = upper + lower + digits;
private final Random random;
private final char[] symbols;
private final char[] buf;
public RandomString(int length, Random random, String symbols) {
if (length < 1) throw new IllegalArgumentException();
if (symbols.length() < 2) throw new IllegalArgumentException();
this.random = Objects.requireNonNull(random);
this.symbols = symbols.toCharArray();
this.buf = new char[length];
}
/**
* Create an alphanumeric string generator.
*/
public RandomString(int length, Random random) {
this(length, random, alphanum);
}
/**
* Create an alphanumeric strings from a secure generator.
*/
public RandomString(int length) {
this(length, new SecureRandom());
}
/**
* Create session identifiers.
*/
public RandomString() {
this(21);
}
}
Usage examples
Create an insecure generator for 8-character identifiers:
RandomString gen = new RandomString(8, ThreadLocalRandom.current());
Create a secure generator for session identifiers:
RandomString session = new RandomString();
Create a generator with easy-to-read codes for printing. The strings are longer than full alphanumeric strings to compensate for using fewer symbols:
String easy = RandomString.digits + "ACEFGHJKLMNPQRUVWXYabcdefhijkprstuvwx";
RandomString tickets = new RandomString(23, new SecureRandom(), easy);
Use as session identifiers
Generating session identifiers that are likely to be unique is not good enough, or you could just use a simple counter. Attackers hijack sessions when predictable identifiers are used.
There is tension between length and security. Shorter identifiers are easier to guess, because there are fewer possibilities. But longer identifiers consume more storage and bandwidth. A larger set of symbols helps, but might cause encoding problems if identifiers are included in URLs or re-entered by hand.
The underlying source of randomness, or entropy, for session identifiers should come from a random number generator designed for cryptography. However, initializing these generators can sometimes be computationally expensive or slow, so effort should be made to re-use them when possible.
Use as object identifiers
Not every application requires security. Random assignment can be an efficient way for multiple entities to generate identifiers in a shared space without any coordination or partitioning. Coordination can be slow, especially in a clustered or distributed environment, and splitting up a space causes problems when entities end up with shares that are too small or too big.
Identifiers generated without taking measures to make them unpredictable should be protected by other means if an attacker might be able to view and manipulate them, as happens in most web applications. There should be a separate authorization system that protects objects whose identifier can be guessed by an attacker without access permission.
Care must be also be taken to use identifiers that are long enough to make collisions unlikely given the anticipated total number of identifiers. This is referred to as "the birthday paradox." The probability of a collision, p, is approximately n2/(2qx), where n is the number of identifiers actually generated, q is the number of distinct symbols in the alphabet, and x is the length of the identifiers. This should be a very small number, like 2‑50 or less.
Working this out shows that the chance of collision among 500k 15-character identifiers is about 2‑52, which is probably less likely than undetected errors from cosmic rays, etc.
Comparison with UUIDs
According to their specification, UUIDs are not designed to be unpredictable, and should not be used as session identifiers.
UUIDs in their standard format take a lot of space: 36 characters for only 122 bits of entropy. (Not all bits of a "random" UUID are selected randomly.) A randomly chosen alphanumeric string packs more entropy in just 21 characters.
UUIDs are not flexible; they have a standardized structure and layout. This is their chief virtue as well as their main weakness. When collaborating with an outside party, the standardization offered by UUIDs may be helpful. For purely internal use, they can be inefficient.
The correct way to avoid SQL injection attacks, no matter which database you use, is to separate the data from SQL, so that data stays data and will never be interpreted as commands by the SQL parser. It is possible to create SQL statement with correctly formatted data parts, but if you don't fully understand the details, you should always use prepared statements and parameterized queries. These are SQL statements that are sent to and parsed by the database server separately from any parameters. This way it is impossible for an attacker to inject malicious SQL.
You basically have two options to achieve this:
Using PDO (for any supported database driver):
$stmt = $pdo->prepare('SELECT * FROM employees WHERE name = :name');
$stmt->execute([ 'name' => $name ]);
foreach ($stmt as $row) {
// Do something with $row
}
Using MySQLi (for MySQL):
$stmt = $dbConnection->prepare('SELECT * FROM employees WHERE name = ?');
$stmt->bind_param('s', $name); // 's' specifies the variable type => 'string'
$stmt->execute();
$result = $stmt->get_result();
while ($row = $result->fetch_assoc()) {
// Do something with $row
}
If you're connecting to a database other than MySQL, there is a driver-specific second option that you can refer to (for example, pg_prepare()
and pg_execute()
for PostgreSQL). PDO is the universal option.
Correctly setting up the connection
Note that when using PDO to access a MySQL database real prepared statements are not used by default. To fix this you have to disable the emulation of prepared statements. An example of creating a connection using PDO is:
$dbConnection = new PDO('mysql:dbname=dbtest;host=127.0.0.1;charset=utf8', 'user', 'password');
$dbConnection->setAttribute(PDO::ATTR_EMULATE_PREPARES, false);
$dbConnection->setAttribute(PDO::ATTR_ERRMODE, PDO::ERRMODE_EXCEPTION);
In the above example the error mode isn't strictly necessary, but it is advised to add it. This way the script will not stop with a Fatal Error
when something goes wrong. And it gives the developer the chance to catch
any error(s) which are throw
n as PDOException
s.
What is mandatory, however, is the first setAttribute()
line, which tells PDO to disable emulated prepared statements and use real prepared statements. This makes sure the statement and the values aren't parsed by PHP before sending it to the MySQL server (giving a possible attacker no chance to inject malicious SQL).
Although you can set the charset
in the options of the constructor, it's important to note that 'older' versions of PHP (before 5.3.6) silently ignored the charset parameter in the DSN.
Explanation
The SQL statement you pass to prepare
is parsed and compiled by the database server. By specifying parameters (either a ?
or a named parameter like :name
in the example above) you tell the database engine where you want to filter on. Then when you call execute
, the prepared statement is combined with the parameter values you specify.
The important thing here is that the parameter values are combined with the compiled statement, not an SQL string. SQL injection works by tricking the script into including malicious strings when it creates SQL to send to the database. So by sending the actual SQL separately from the parameters, you limit the risk of ending up with something you didn't intend.
Any parameters you send when using a prepared statement will just be treated as strings (although the database engine may do some optimization so parameters may end up as numbers too, of course). In the example above, if the $name
variable contains 'Sarah'; DELETE FROM employees
the result would simply be a search for the string "'Sarah'; DELETE FROM employees"
, and you will not end up with an empty table.
Another benefit of using prepared statements is that if you execute the same statement many times in the same session it will only be parsed and compiled once, giving you some speed gains.
Oh, and since you asked about how to do it for an insert, here's an example (using PDO):
$preparedStatement = $db->prepare('INSERT INTO table (column) VALUES (:column)');
$preparedStatement->execute([ 'column' => $unsafeValue ]);
Can prepared statements be used for dynamic queries?
While you can still use prepared statements for the query parameters, the structure of the dynamic query itself cannot be parametrized and certain query features cannot be parametrized.
For these specific scenarios, the best thing to do is use a whitelist filter that restricts the possible values.
// Value whitelist
// $dir can only be 'DESC', otherwise it will be 'ASC'
if (empty($dir) || $dir !== 'DESC') {
$dir = 'ASC';
}
Best Answer
It's not a complete answer, but I can tell you that the 13th hex digit is always 4 because it denotes the version of the algorithm used to generate the GUID (id est, v4); also, and I quote Wikipedia:
The rest of the article, and its references: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guid
--Edit--
From a security standpoint, I'd suggest that you generate your session ID however you feel like, then cryptographically sign it; that way you can pack in whatever information you want and then just slap a signature on the end - the possible issue being the tradeoff between the size/strength of your key and the resulting size of the cookie. GUIDs are useful as IDs, but I'd only rely on a dedicated cryptographic technique for security.