You should implement a session timeout of your own. Both options mentioned by others (session.gc_maxlifetime and session.cookie_lifetime) are not reliable. I'll explain the reasons for that.
First:
session.gc_maxlifetime
session.gc_maxlifetime specifies the number of seconds after which data will be seen as 'garbage' and cleaned up. Garbage collection occurs during session start.
But the garbage collector is only started with a probability of session.gc_probability divided by session.gc_divisor. And using the default values for those options (1 and 100 respectively), the chance is only at 1%.
Well, you could simply adjust these values so that the garbage collector is started more often. But when the garbage collector is started, it will check the validity for every registered session. And that is cost-intensive.
Furthermore, when using PHP's default session.save_handler files, the session data is stored in files in a path specified in session.save_path. With that session handler, the age of the session data is calculated on the file's last modification date and not the last access date:
Note: If you are using the default file-based session handler, your filesystem must keep track of access times (atime). Windows FAT does not so you will have to come up with another way to handle garbage collecting your session if you are stuck with a FAT filesystem or any other filesystem where atime tracking is not available. Since PHP 4.2.3 it has used mtime (modified date) instead of atime. So, you won't have problems with filesystems where atime tracking is not available.
So it additionally might occur that a session data file is deleted while the session itself is still considered as valid because the session data was not updated recently.
And second:
session.cookie_lifetime
session.cookie_lifetime specifies the lifetime of the cookie in seconds which is sent to the browser. […]
Yes, that's right. This only affects the cookie lifetime and the session itself may still be valid. But it's the server's task to invalidate a session, not the client. So this doesn't help anything. In fact, having session.cookie_lifetime set to 0
would make the session’s cookie a real session cookie that is only valid until the browser is closed.
Conclusion / best solution:
The best solution is to implement a session timeout of your own. Use a simple time stamp that denotes the time of the last activity (i.e. request) and update it with every request:
if (isset($_SESSION['LAST_ACTIVITY']) && (time() - $_SESSION['LAST_ACTIVITY'] > 1800)) {
// last request was more than 30 minutes ago
session_unset(); // unset $_SESSION variable for the run-time
session_destroy(); // destroy session data in storage
}
$_SESSION['LAST_ACTIVITY'] = time(); // update last activity time stamp
Updating the session data with every request also changes the session file's modification date so that the session is not removed by the garbage collector prematurely.
You can also use an additional time stamp to regenerate the session ID periodically to avoid attacks on sessions like session fixation:
if (!isset($_SESSION['CREATED'])) {
$_SESSION['CREATED'] = time();
} else if (time() - $_SESSION['CREATED'] > 1800) {
// session started more than 30 minutes ago
session_regenerate_id(true); // change session ID for the current session and invalidate old session ID
$_SESSION['CREATED'] = time(); // update creation time
}
Notes:
session.gc_maxlifetime
should be at least equal to the lifetime of this custom expiration handler (1800 in this example);
- if you want to expire the session after 30 minutes of activity instead of after 30 minutes since start, you'll also need to use
setcookie
with an expire of time()+60*30
to keep the session cookie active.
What happens
When the user views a form to create, update, or destroy a resource, the Rails app creates a random authenticity_token
, stores this token in the session, and places it in a hidden field in the form. When the user submits the form, Rails looks for the authenticity_token
, compares it to the one stored in the session, and if they match the request is allowed to continue.
Why it happens
Since the authenticity token is stored in the session, the client cannot know its value. This prevents people from submitting forms to a Rails app without viewing the form within that app itself.
Imagine that you are using service A, you logged into the service and everything is ok. Now imagine that you went to use service B, and you saw a picture you like, and pressed on the picture to view a larger size of it. Now, if some evil code was there at service B, it might send a request to service A (which you are logged into), and ask to delete your account, by sending a request to http://serviceA.com/close_account
. This is what is known as CSRF (Cross Site Request Forgery).
If service A is using authenticity tokens, this attack vector is no longer applicable, since the request from service B would not contain the correct authenticity token, and will not be allowed to continue.
API docs describes details about meta tag:
CSRF protection is turned on with the protect_from_forgery
method,
which checks the token and resets the session if it doesn't match what
was expected. A call to this method is generated for new Rails
applications by default.
The token parameter is named authenticity_token
by default. The name
and value of this token must be added to every layout that renders
forms by including csrf_meta_tags
in the HTML head.
Notes
Keep in mind, Rails only verifies not idempotent methods (POST, PUT/PATCH and DELETE). GET request are not checked for authenticity token. Why? because the HTTP specification states that GET requests is idempotent and should not create, alter, or destroy resources at the server, and the request should be idempotent (if you run the same command multiple times, you should get the same result every time).
Also the real implementation is a bit more complicated as defined in the beginning, ensuring better security. Rails does not issue the same stored token with every form. Neither does it generate and store a different token every time. It generates and stores a cryptographic hash in a session and issues new cryptographic tokens, which can be matched against the stored one, every time a page is rendered. See request_forgery_protection.rb.
Lessons
Use authenticity_token
to protect your not idempotent methods (POST, PUT/PATCH, and DELETE). Also make sure not to allow any GET requests that could potentially modify resources on the server.
EDIT: Check the comment by @erturne regarding GET requests being idempotent. He explains it in a better way than I have done here.
Best Answer
We had the problem with loosing the session due to capybara switching the host name in mid-test. The scenario was something like the following:
This may be worth investigating. You can get the
current_url
in your session, and you may set a new host for capybara usinghost! 'newhost.org'