The correct way to avoid SQL injection attacks, no matter which database you use, is to separate the data from SQL, so that data stays data and will never be interpreted as commands by the SQL parser. It is possible to create SQL statement with correctly formatted data parts, but if you don't fully understand the details, you should always use prepared statements and parameterized queries. These are SQL statements that are sent to and parsed by the database server separately from any parameters. This way it is impossible for an attacker to inject malicious SQL.
You basically have two options to achieve this:
Using PDO (for any supported database driver):
$stmt = $pdo->prepare('SELECT * FROM employees WHERE name = :name');
$stmt->execute([ 'name' => $name ]);
foreach ($stmt as $row) {
// Do something with $row
}
Using MySQLi (for MySQL):
$stmt = $dbConnection->prepare('SELECT * FROM employees WHERE name = ?');
$stmt->bind_param('s', $name); // 's' specifies the variable type => 'string'
$stmt->execute();
$result = $stmt->get_result();
while ($row = $result->fetch_assoc()) {
// Do something with $row
}
If you're connecting to a database other than MySQL, there is a driver-specific second option that you can refer to (for example, pg_prepare()
and pg_execute()
for PostgreSQL). PDO is the universal option.
Correctly setting up the connection
Note that when using PDO to access a MySQL database real prepared statements are not used by default. To fix this you have to disable the emulation of prepared statements. An example of creating a connection using PDO is:
$dbConnection = new PDO('mysql:dbname=dbtest;host=127.0.0.1;charset=utf8', 'user', 'password');
$dbConnection->setAttribute(PDO::ATTR_EMULATE_PREPARES, false);
$dbConnection->setAttribute(PDO::ATTR_ERRMODE, PDO::ERRMODE_EXCEPTION);
In the above example the error mode isn't strictly necessary, but it is advised to add it. This way the script will not stop with a Fatal Error
when something goes wrong. And it gives the developer the chance to catch
any error(s) which are throw
n as PDOException
s.
What is mandatory, however, is the first setAttribute()
line, which tells PDO to disable emulated prepared statements and use real prepared statements. This makes sure the statement and the values aren't parsed by PHP before sending it to the MySQL server (giving a possible attacker no chance to inject malicious SQL).
Although you can set the charset
in the options of the constructor, it's important to note that 'older' versions of PHP (before 5.3.6) silently ignored the charset parameter in the DSN.
Explanation
The SQL statement you pass to prepare
is parsed and compiled by the database server. By specifying parameters (either a ?
or a named parameter like :name
in the example above) you tell the database engine where you want to filter on. Then when you call execute
, the prepared statement is combined with the parameter values you specify.
The important thing here is that the parameter values are combined with the compiled statement, not an SQL string. SQL injection works by tricking the script into including malicious strings when it creates SQL to send to the database. So by sending the actual SQL separately from the parameters, you limit the risk of ending up with something you didn't intend.
Any parameters you send when using a prepared statement will just be treated as strings (although the database engine may do some optimization so parameters may end up as numbers too, of course). In the example above, if the $name
variable contains 'Sarah'; DELETE FROM employees
the result would simply be a search for the string "'Sarah'; DELETE FROM employees"
, and you will not end up with an empty table.
Another benefit of using prepared statements is that if you execute the same statement many times in the same session it will only be parsed and compiled once, giving you some speed gains.
Oh, and since you asked about how to do it for an insert, here's an example (using PDO):
$preparedStatement = $db->prepare('INSERT INTO table (column) VALUES (:column)');
$preparedStatement->execute([ 'column' => $unsafeValue ]);
Can prepared statements be used for dynamic queries?
While you can still use prepared statements for the query parameters, the structure of the dynamic query itself cannot be parametrized and certain query features cannot be parametrized.
For these specific scenarios, the best thing to do is use a whitelist filter that restricts the possible values.
// Value whitelist
// $dir can only be 'DESC', otherwise it will be 'ASC'
if (empty($dir) || $dir !== 'DESC') {
$dir = 'ASC';
}
There are different ways to delete an array element, where some are more useful for some specific tasks than others.
Deleting a single array element
If you want to delete just one array element you can use unset()
or alternatively \array_splice()
.
If you know the value and don’t know the key to delete the element you can use \array_search()
to get the key. This only works if the element does not occur more than once, since \array_search
returns the first hit only.
Note that when you use unset()
the array keys won’t change. If you want to reindex the keys you can use \array_values()
after unset()
, which will convert all keys to numerically enumerated keys starting from 0.
Code:
$array = [0 => "a", 1 => "b", 2 => "c"];
unset($array[1]);
// ↑ Key which you want to delete
Output:
[
[0] => a
[2] => c
]
If you use \array_splice()
the keys will automatically be reindexed, but the associative keys won’t change — as opposed to \array_values()
, which will convert all keys to numerical keys.
\array_splice()
needs the offset, not the key, as the second parameter.
Code:
$array = [0 => "a", 1 => "b", 2 => "c"];
\array_splice($array, 1, 1);
// ↑ Offset which you want to delete
Output:
[
[0] => a
[1] => c
]
array_splice()
, same as unset()
, take the array by reference. You don’t assign the return values of those functions back to the array.
Deleting multiple array elements
If you want to delete multiple array elements and don’t want to call unset()
or \array_splice()
multiple times you can use the functions \array_diff()
or \array_diff_key()
depending on whether you know the values or the keys of the elements which you want to delete.
If you know the values of the array elements which you want to delete, then you can use \array_diff()
. As before with unset()
it won’t change the keys of the array.
Code:
$array = [0 => "a", 1 => "b", 2 => "c", 3 => "c"];
$array = \array_diff($array, ["a", "c"]);
// └────────┘
// Array values which you want to delete
Output:
[
[1] => b
]
If you know the keys of the elements which you want to delete, then you want to use \array_diff_key()
. You have to make sure you pass the keys as keys in the second parameter and not as values. Keys won’t reindex.
Code:
$array = [0 => "a", 1 => "b", 2 => "c"];
$array = \array_diff_key($array, [0 => "xy", "2" => "xy"]);
// ↑ ↑
// Array keys which you want to delete
Output:
[
[1] => b
]
If you want to use unset()
or \array_splice()
to delete multiple elements with the same value you can use \array_keys()
to get all the keys for a specific value and then delete all elements.
Best Answer
Foreword
Starting with your table definition:
Here are the changes:
Fname
,Lname
andEmail
will be encrypted using a symmetric cipher, provided by OpenSSL,IV
field will store the initialisation vector used for encryption. The storage requirements depend on the cipher and mode used; more about this later.Password
field will be hashed using a one-way password hash,Encryption
Cipher and mode
Choosing the best encryption cipher and mode is beyond the scope of this answer, but the final choice affects the size of both the encryption key and initialisation vector; for this post we will be using AES-256-CBC which has a fixed block size of 16 bytes and a key size of either 16, 24 or 32 bytes.
Encryption key
A good encryption key is a binary blob that's generated from a reliable random number generator. The following example would be recommended (>= 5.3):
This can be done once or multiple times (if you wish to create a chain of encryption keys). Keep these as private as possible.
IV
The initialisation vector adds randomness to the encryption and required for CBC mode. These values should be ideally be used only once (technically once per encryption key), so an update to any part of a row should regenerate it.
A function is provided to help you generate the IV:
Example
Let's encrypt the name field, using the earlier
$encryption_key
and$iv
; to do this, we have to pad our data to the block size:Storage requirements
The encrypted output, like the IV, is binary; storing these values in a database can be accomplished by using designated column types such as
BINARY
orVARBINARY
.The output value, like the IV, is binary; to store those values in MySQL, consider using
BINARY
orVARBINARY
columns. If this is not an option, you can also convert the binary data into a textual representation usingbase64_encode()
orbin2hex()
, doing so requires between 33% to 100% more storage space.Decryption
Decryption of the stored values is similar:
Authenticated encryption
You can further improve the integrity of the generated cipher text by appending a signature that's generated from a secret key (different from the encryption key) and the cipher text. Before the cipher text is decrypted, the signature is first verified (preferably with a constant-time comparison method).
Example
See also:
hash_equals()
Hashing
Storing a reversible password in your database must be avoided as much as possible; you only wish to verify the password rather than knowing its contents. If a user loses their password, it's better to allow them to reset it rather than sending them their original one (make sure that password reset can only be done for a limited time).
Applying a hash function is a one-way operation; afterwards it can be safely used for verification without revealing the original data; for passwords, a brute force method is a feasible approach to uncover it due to its relatively short length and poor password choices of many people.
Hashing algorithms such as MD5 or SHA1 were made to verify file contents against a known hash value. They're greatly optimized to make this verification as fast as possible while still being accurate. Given their relatively limited output space it was easy to build a database with known passwords and their respective hash outputs, the rainbow tables.
Adding a salt to the password before hashing it would render a rainbow table useless, but recent hardware advancements made brute force lookups a viable approach. That's why you need a hashing algorithm that's deliberately slow and simply impossible to optimize. It should also be able to increase the load for faster hardware without affecting the ability to verify existing password hashes to make it future proof.
Currently there are two popular choices available:
This answer will use an example with bcrypt.
Generation
A password hash can be generated like this:
The salt is generated with
openssl_random_pseudo_bytes()
to form a random blob of data which is then run throughbase64_encode()
andstrtr()
to match the required alphabet of[A-Za-z0-9/.]
.The
crypt()
function performs the hashing based on the algorithm ($2y$
for Blowfish), the cost factor (a factor of 13 takes roughly 0.40s on a 3GHz machine) and the salt of 22 characters.Validation
Once you have fetched the row containing the user information, you validate the password in this manner:
To verify a password, you call
crypt()
again but you pass the previously calculated hash as the salt value. The return value yields the same hash if the given password matches the hash. To verify the hash, it's often recommended to use a constant-time comparison function to avoid timing attacks.Password hashing with PHP 5.5
PHP 5.5 introduced the password hashing functions that you can use to simplify the above method of hashing:
And verifying:
See also:
password_hash()
,password_verify()